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Philosophy

<OpenstaxParagraph>
	Many philosophers, Western and non-Western, have equated the self to the mind. But what is the mind? A monist response is the mind is the brain. Yet, if the mind is the brain, a purely biological entity, then how do we explain consciousness? Moreover, if we take the position that the mind is immaterial but the body is material, we are left with the question of how two very different types of things can causally affect the other. The question of “How do the two nonidentical and dissimilar entities experience a causal relationship?” is known as the mind-body problem. This section explores some alternative philosophical responses to these questions.
</OpenstaxParagraph>
<OpenstaxH3>Physicalism</OpenstaxH3>
<OpenstaxParagraph>
	Reducing the mind to the brain seems intuitive given advances in neuroscience and other related sciences that deepen our understanding of cognition. As a doctrine, <OpenstaxTerm>physicalism</OpenstaxTerm> is committed to the assumption that everything is physical. Exactly how to define the physical is a matter of contention. Driving this view is the assertion that nothing that is nonphysical has physical effects.
</OpenstaxParagraph>
<OpenstaxNote>
	<OpenstaxNoteTitle> Think Like a Philosopher </OpenstaxNoteTitle> 
	<OpenstaxParagraph>
		Listen to the podcast “<a href="https://openstax.org/r/david-papineau">David Papineau on Physicalism</a>” in the series <OpenstaxEm>Philosophy Bites.</OpenstaxEm>
	</OpenstaxParagraph>
	<OpenstaxParagraph>
		Focus on the thought experiment concerning what Mary knows. Here is a summary of the thought experiment:
	</OpenstaxParagraph>
	<OpenstaxParagraph>
		Mary is a scientist and specializes in the neurophysiology of color. Strangely, her world has black, white, and shades of gray but lacks color (weird, but go with it!). Due to her expertise, she knows every physical fact concerning colors. What if Mary found herself in a room in which color as we experience it is present? Would she <OpenstaxEm>learn</OpenstaxEm> anything? A physicalist must respond “no”! Do you agree? How would you respond?
	</OpenstaxParagraph>
</OpenstaxNote>
<OpenstaxH3>John Locke and Identity</OpenstaxH3>
<OpenstaxParagraph>
	In place of the biological, Locke defined identity as the continuity lent through what we refer to as consciousness. His approach is often referred to as the psychological continuity approach, as our memories and our ability to reflect upon our memories constitute identity for Locke. In his <OpenstaxEm>Essay on Human Understanding</OpenstaxEm>, Locke (as cited by Gordon-Roth 2019) observed, “We must consider what Person stands for . . . which, I think, is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places.” He offered a thought experiment to illustrate his point. Imagine a prince and cobbler whose memories (we might say consciousness) were swapped. The notion is far-fetched, but if this were to happen, we would assert that the prince was now the cobbler and the cobbler was now the prince. Therefore, what individuates us cannot be the body (or the biological).
</OpenstaxParagraph>
<OpenstaxNote>
	<OpenstaxNoteTitle> Video </OpenstaxNoteTitle> <OpenstaxH3> John Locke on Personal Identity </OpenstaxH3>
	<OpenstaxParagraph>
		Part of the BBC Radio 4 series <OpenstaxEm>A History of Ideas</OpenstaxEm>, this clip is narrated by Gillian Anderson and scripted by Nigel Warburton.
	</OpenstaxParagraph>
	<OpenstaxIframe src="https://openstax.org/r/john-locke-on-personal-identity" width="660" height="371.4" />
</OpenstaxNote>
<OpenstaxH3>The Problem of Consciousness</OpenstaxH3>
<OpenstaxParagraph>
	Christof <OpenstaxTerm>Koch</OpenstaxTerm> (2018) has said that “consciousness is everything you experience.” Koch offered examples, such as “a tune stuck in your head,” the “throbbing pain from a toothache,” and “a parent’s love for a child” to illustrate the experience of consciousness. Our first-person experiences are what we think of intuitively when we try to describe what consciousness is. If we were to focus on the throbbing pain of a toothache as listed above, we can see that there is the experiencing of the toothache. Curiously, there is also the experiencing of the experiencing of the toothache. Introspection and theorizing built upon first-person inspections affords vivid and moving accounts of the things experienced, referred to as <OpenstaxEm><OpenstaxTerm>qualia</OpenstaxTerm>.</OpenstaxEm>
</OpenstaxParagraph>
<OpenstaxParagraph>
	An optimal accounting of consciousness, however, should not only explain <OpenstaxEm>what</OpenstaxEm> consciousness is but should also offer an explanation concerning <OpenstaxEm>how</OpenstaxEm> consciousness came to be and <OpenstaxEm>why</OpenstaxEm> consciousness is present. What difference or differences does consciousness introduce?
</OpenstaxParagraph>
<OpenstaxNote>
	<OpenstaxNoteTitle> Podcast </OpenstaxNoteTitle> 
	<OpenstaxParagraph>
		Listen to the podcast “<a href="https://openstax.org/r/what-it-is-to-be-conscious">Ted Honderich on What It Is to Be Conscious</a>,” in the series <OpenstaxEm>Philosophy Bites.</OpenstaxEm>
	</OpenstaxParagraph>
</OpenstaxNote>
<OpenstaxH3>Rene Descartes and Dualism</OpenstaxH3>
<OpenstaxParagraph>
	<OpenstaxTerm>Dualism</OpenstaxTerm>, as the name suggests, attempts to account for the mind through the introduction of two entities. The dualist split was addressed earlier in the discussion of substance. Plato argued for the reality of immaterial forms but admitted another type of thing—the material. Aristotle disagreed with his teacher Plato and insisted on the location of the immaterial within the material realm. How might the mind and consciousness be explained through dualism?
</OpenstaxParagraph>
<OpenstaxNote>
	<OpenstaxNoteTitle> Video </OpenstaxNoteTitle> <OpenstaxH3> Mind Body Dualism </OpenstaxH3>
	<OpenstaxIframe src="https://openstax.org/r/mind-body-dualism" width="660" height="371.4" />
</OpenstaxNote>
<OpenstaxParagraph>
	A substance dualist, in reference to the mind problem, asserts that there are two fundamental and irreducible realities that are needed to fully explain the self. The mind is nonidentical to the body, and the body is nonidentical to the mind. The French philosopher René <OpenstaxTerm>Descartes</OpenstaxTerm> (1596–1650) offered a very influential version of substance dualism in his 1641 work <OpenstaxEm>Meditations on First Philosophy.</OpenstaxEm> In that work, Descartes referred to the mind as a thinking thing (<OpenstaxEm>res cogitans</OpenstaxEm>) and the body as an extended nonthinking thing (<OpenstaxEm>res extensa</OpenstaxEm>). Descartes associated identity with the thinking thing. He introduced a model in which the self and the mind were eternal.
</OpenstaxParagraph>
<OpenstaxFigure id="fig-00003" src="https://openstax.org/apps/archive/20240226.174525/resources/ff67312f3f1774684d17300aedcea0b1036a3ace" alt="A drawing shows a kneeling person holding a skull. Another person is standing behind the kneeling person." mediaType="image/jpeg" width="800" height="778" />
<OpenstaxFigureText width="800">
	<strong>Figure 6.9</strong> Alas Poor Yorick. In Shakespeare’s Hamlet, the character of Hamlet holds the skull of a court jester, his departed childhood companion, and laments his passing. Hamlet contemplates the fleetingness of existence through the moment. But what exactly is it that experiences existence? What is the self? (credit: “Hamlet with Yorick’s skull” by Henry Courtney Selous/Wikimedia, Public Domain)
</OpenstaxFigureText>
<OpenstaxH3>Behaviorism</OpenstaxH3>
<OpenstaxParagraph>
	There is a response that rejects the idea of an independent mind. Within this approach, what is important is not mental states or the existence of a mind as a sort of central processor, but activity that can be translated into statements concerning observable behavior (Palmer 2016, 122). As within most philosophical perspectives, there are many different “takes” on the most correct understanding. <OpenstaxTerm>Behaviorism</OpenstaxTerm> is no exception. The “hard” behaviorist asserts that there are no mental states. You might consider this perspective the purist or “die-hard” perspective. The “soft” behaviorist, the moderate position, does not deny the possibility of minds and mental events but believes that theorizing concerning human activity should be based on behavior.
</OpenstaxParagraph>
<OpenstaxParagraph>
	Before dismissing the view, pause and consider the plausibility of the position. Do we ever really know another’s mind? There is some validity to the notion that we ought to rely on behavior when trying to know or to make sense of the “other.” But if you have a toothache, and you experience myself being aware of the <OpenstaxEm>qualia</OpenstaxEm> associated with a toothache (e.g., pain, swelling, irritability, etc.), are these sensations more than activities? What of the experience that accompanies the experience?
</OpenstaxParagraph>

6.2.5 The Mind as Self

1 Introduction to Philosophy

1.1 What Is Philosophy?

1.1.1 Historical Origins of Philosophy

1.1.2 How It All Hangs Together

1.2 How Do Philosophers Arrive at Truth?

1.2.1 Sources of Evidence

1.2.2 Logic

1.2.3 Conceptual Analysis

1.2.4 Trade-offs

1.3 Socrates as a Paradigmatic Historical Philosopher

1.3.1 “The Life Which Is Unexamined Is Not Worth Living”

1.3.2 Human Wisdom Is Worth Little or Nothing

1.3.3 The Importance of Doing No Harm

1.4 An Overview of Contemporary Philosophy

1.4.1 What Can You Do with a Philosophy Major?

1.4.2 An Overview of Your Philosophy Textbook

2 Critical Thinking, Research, Reading, and Writing

2.1 The Brain Is an Inference Machine

2.1.1 The Brain’s Adaptive Ability to Plan Ahead

2.1.2 The Evolutionary Advantage of Shortcuts

2.2 Overcoming Cognitive Biases and Engaging in Critical Reflection

2.2.1 Critical Reflection and Metacognition

2.2.2 Cognitive Biases

2.3 Developing Good Habits of Mind

2.3.1 Strive for Objectivity

2.3.2 Adopt Epistemic Humility

2.4 Gathering Information, Evaluating Sources, and Understanding Evidence

2.4.1 Start with a Strong Foundation

2.4.2 The SIFT Method (Four Moves for Student Fact Checkers)

2.5 Reading Philosophy

2.5.1 Prepare to Read

2.5.2 Engaging with Philosophical Texts

2.5.3 Pre-reading

2.5.4 First Read

2.5.5 Close Read

2.6 Writing Philosophy Papers

2.6.1 Identify Claims

2.6.2 Collect Evidence and Build Your Case

2.6.3 Organize Your Paper

3 The Early History of Philosophy around the World

3.1 Indigenous Philosophy

3.1.1 Challenges in Researching Indigenous Philosophy

3.1.2 Indigenous African Philosophy

3.1.3 Indigenous North American Philosophical Thought

3.1.4 Mesoamerican Philosophy

3.2 Classical Indian Philosophy

3.2.1 The Vedic Tradition

3.2.2 Classical Indian Darshanas

3.3 Classical Chinese Philosophy

3.3.1 Early Chinese Philosophical Thought prior to Confucius

3.3.2 Confucianism

3.3.3 Daoism

3.3.4 Mohism

4 The Emergence of Classical Philosophy

4.1 Historiography and the History of Philosophy

4.1.1 Presentist Approach

4.1.2 Contextualist Approach

4.1.3 Hermeneutic Approach

4.2 Classical Philosophy

4.2.1 Egyptian Origins of Classical Philosophy

4.2.2 Ancient Greek Philosophy

4.2.3 The Presocratics

4.2.4 Socrates and Plato

4.2.5 Aristotle

4.2.6 Epicureans

4.2.7 Roman Philosophy

4.3 Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Philosophy

4.3.1 Defining Jewish, Christian, and Islamic Philosophy

4.3.2 Early Jewish Philosophy

4.3.3 Early Christian Philosophy

4.3.4 Islamic Philosophy

4.3.5 Late Medieval Philosophy in Christian Europe

4.3.6 Jewish Philosophers in the Christian and Islamic Worlds

4.3.7 The Rise of Reason in the Early Modern Era

5 Logic and Reasoning

5.1 Philosophical Methods for Discovering Truth

5.1.1 Dialectics and Philosophical Argumentation

5.1.2 The Use of Reason to Discover Truth

5.1.3 Testing Hypotheses

5.1.4 Laws of Logic

5.1.5 Normativity in Logic

5.2 Logical Statements

5.2.1 Conditionals

5.2.2 Universal Statements

5.3 Arguments

5.3.1 Getting to the Premises

5.3.2 The Difference between Truth and Logic

5.4 Types of Inferences

5.4.1 Deductive Reasoning

5.4.2 Inductive Inferences

5.4.3 Abductive Reasoning

5.5 Informal Fallacies

5.5.1 Fallacies of Relevance

5.5.2 Fallacies of Weak Induction

5.5.3 Fallacies of Unwarranted Assumption

5.5.4 Fallacies of Diversion

6 Metaphysics

6.1 Substance

6.1.1 Fundamentality: The One and the Many

Question	Answer
a view that posits two types of being in order to account fully for the nature of the thing under scrutiny.	Dualism
the notion that being is material or physical.	Physicalism